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CATEGORY THEORY, LOGIC AND FORMAL LINGUISTICS:
SOME CONNECTIONS, OLD AND NEW
JEAN GILLIBERT, CHRISTIAN RETOR ´E
ABSTRACT. We seize the opportunity of the publication of selected papers from the Logic,
categories, semantics workshop in the Journal of Applied Logic to survey some current
trends in logic, namely intuitionistic and linear type theories, that interweave categorical,
geometrical and computational considerations. We thereafter present how these rich logical
frameworks can model the way language conveys meaning.
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1. A SEMINAR AND WORKSHOP ON CATEGORY THEORY, LOGIC AND LINGUISTIC
APPLICATIONS
The present issue of the Journal of Applied Logic gathers a selection of papers presented
at a workshop Logic, categories, semantics held in Bordeaux in November 2010. This
workshop was organised as a fitting conclusion to the activities of a weekly reading group
a weekly reading group called Sheaves in logic and in geometry in 2009/2010 and Logic,
categories, geometry in 2010/2011.
Those activities are common to the maths and computing departments of the University
of Bordeaux (IMB-CNRS and LaBRI-CNRS). Although he did not contribute to this intro-
duction, we must thank Boas Erez (IMB, Bordeaux) who was an enthusiastic participant
and speaker in our reading group. We would like to thank for their scientific and finan-
cial support: our tow departments, (Institut de Mathe´matiques de Bordeaux, Laboratoire
Bordelais de Recherche en Informatique), INRIA Bordeaux Sud-Ouest, the ANR project
LOCI, and the project ITIPY (Aquitaine Region) and the French mathematical society
(SMF).
Unfortunately, the material in this issue of the Journal of Applied Logic does not cover
all the great talks we had the privilege to hear, but one can find published material that
more or less cover these talks (and these references themselves include further references):
• Pierre Cartier (IHES, Bures) Sur les origines de la connexion entre logique intu-
itionniste, cate´gories et faisceaux, cf. [9];
• Jean-Yves Girard (CNRS, IML, Marseille) Interdire ou re´futer? Le statut ambigu
de la normativite´, cf. [19];
• Paul-Andre´ Mellie`s (CNRS, PPS, Paris) Logical proofs understood as topological
knots, cf. [33];
• Michael Moortgat (Universiteit Utrecht) Continuation semantics for generalized
Lambek calculi, cf. [35];
• Carl Pollard (Ohio State University, Columbus) Remarks on categorical semantics
of natural language, cf. [37].
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2. INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC
Type theory and categorical logic, which are at the hear of this issue, all rely on intu-
itionistic logic. Even linear logic, which is also discussed by two articles of this issue, may
be viewed as a refinement of intuitionistic logic.
It is quite a challenge to explain briefly what intuitionistic logic is and how it relates to
other logical trends. Regarding the historical development of logic, we refer to the stan-
dard [23] and regarding a standard logic master course we refer the reader to the standard
textbook [43] which includes a chapter on intuitionistic logic.
Logic is concerned with“truth”, and let us vaguely say that “truth” holds or not of formu-
lae that are formalisations of common language sentences, or of mathematical statements,
and as such logic has at least two facets. A formula F can be true because it is correctly de-
rived from formulae that are already established or assumed to be true, and this is the proof
theoretical view of truth that started with Aristotle. The same formula F can also be true
in all or in some situation once the symbols in the formula are properly interpreted: that’s
the model theoretical view of truth, which is much more recent. Besides these two well es-
tablished viewpoints, there exists a slightly different view of “truth” with Ancient origins,
dialectics which emerge from the interaction between proofs and refutations. Nowadays
this view culminates in game theoretical semantics, and ludics, and the presentations by
J.-Y. Girard and P.-A. Mellis during our workshop developed this interactive view. [19, 33]
An important theorem, due to Go¨del as an impressive number of the fundamental results
logic, is that for first order classical logic, the two notions of truth coincide: a formula is
true in any model if and only if it can be proved. This result admits a a more striking for-
mulation as: a formula C can be derived from formulae H1, . . . ,Hn if and only if any model
satisfying H1, . . . ,Hn satisfies C as well. Such a result holds for classical propositional
logic and for classical first-order logic, also known as predicate calculus.
Intuitionistic logic comes from doubts that appeared during the crisis of the foundations
of mathematics, between the XIX and XX centuries. These doubts concerned existential
statements in infinite sets. For instance it is admittedly a bit strange, especially in an
infinite universe, that ∃x(B(x) =⇒ ∀yB(y)), although it is absolutely correct in classical
logic using principles like U =⇒ V ≡¬U ∨V , ¬¬A≡ A, ¬∀xA(x)≡∃x¬A(x). According
to intuitionistic logic, tertium non datur, or any of the principles that are equivalent to it,
like reductio ad absurdum or Pierce’s law, should be left out from deduction principles.
When restricting ourselves to intuitionistic logic both facets of truth are modified:
• In order to maintain the completeness results, models need to be more complex:
the usual models ought to be replaced with structured families of classical models,
like Kripke models or (pre)sheaves, cf. section 3.
• Intuitionistic proofs are more interesting: as opposed to classical proofs, they can
be viewed as algorithms (as programs of a typed functional programming lan-
guage) or as morphisms in a category (which is not a poset, i.e. with many mor-
phisms from an object to another).
Each of these two aspects brings connections with category theory. The first one yields
models of higher order intuitionistic logic, e.g. with (pre)sheaves of L -structures (clas-
sical models, roughly speaking). The second one yields models that interpret proofs as
morphisms in a cartesian closed category.
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(PRE)SHEAVES, TOPOSES AND CATEGORICAL MODELS OF INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC
Pierre Cartier reminded us in the inaugural lecture of the workshop that the connection
between intuitionistic logic and topos theory appeared in the sixties. We refer the reader to
[9] for a survey, and to [30] for a thorough treatment, and to [29] for an excellent textbook
on category theory.
Inspired by the work of Eilenberg and Mac Lane on categories, Lawvere started in 1964
to introduce a categorical approach to set theory, and Lambek was looking at categories as
deductive systems, the 1972 book edited by Lawvere Toposes, Algebraic Geometry, and
Logic gives a pretty good idea of the landscape at the end of the 60s. [27]
At the same time, Grothendieck was introducing groundbreaking concepts in order to
define a topology on an algebraic variety that would play a similar role to the topology
of the complex points, namely the e´tale topology. The first step in Grothendieck’s con-
struction is the notion of site, that is, a category endowed with a notion of covering that
is reminiscent of open coverings in topology. The concept of site does not exactly cap-
ture the‘topology” of a situation, since different sites can give rise to the same category
of sheaves. Thus Grothendieck chose to take a category of sheaves of sets over a given
site as a notion of generalized topological space, and he called such a category a topos But
another important idea of Grothendieck was somehow more surprising: the e´tale site is just
a step in the construction, the final notion to study is the category of sheaves of sets on the
site, that he calls a topos. This category has many properties in common with the category
of sets, and possesses a good notion of localisation. These radically new ideas were first
developed by Grothendieck and his group in [1].
Taking into account this new approach, Lawvere and Tierney in [26] gave before 1970
a new definition of topos (elementary toposes), which does not refer to a site. One of
the avantages of this theory is that each topos contains an object Ω, that plays the role
of all possible truth values, and has the (internal) structure of a Heyting algebra. Hence
intuitionist logic naturally appears as being the internal logic of the topos.
This connection with intuitionistic logic was formulated by Lawvere at the same time
[26]. Shortly afterwards, Lawvere and Tierney in [27] discovered that models of set the-
ory corresponding to proofs of the independence of the axiom of choice and continuum
hypothesis by Cohen’s method of forcing [12] were in fact elementary toposes see e.g.
[30, 8].
On the other hand, the internal logic of the topos shed a new light on categories of
sheaves. Namely, one can handle sheaves as if they were sets with elements but with re-
spect to the internal language, but when reasoning about these elements one should follow
should follow the rules of intuitionistic logic.
In order to fix ideas, let us recall that a category C is defined by the following data: (a)
a class of objects; (b) a class of arrows (or morphisms) whose domain and codomain are
objects of C ; (c) a partial binary operation on arrows called composition, required to be
associative; (d) every object is endowed with an identity arrow. If for any objects A and
B of C , the class Hom(A,B) of all morphisms from A to B is a set, the category is said to
be locally small, and most of the useful categories are locally small. If the class of objects
and of morphisms of C are sets, C is said to be small.
It is easy to define morphisms of categories, which for historical reasons are called
functors.
A category can be seen as a directed graph with a composition operation on arrows.
The most basic examples of categories are the category of sets, the category of groups,
the category of K-vector spaces where K is a field, the category of topological spaces,
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etc. Roughly speaking, categories allow to handle most kind of structural questions in
mathematics.
We will now focus our attention on sheaves, which are central in this story. Let X be a
topological space. A presheaf of sets is a contravariant functor from the category of open
subsets of X (a poset, actually) to the category of sets1.
A morphism of presheaves φ : A → B is given by a family of maps φU : A(U)→ B(U)
(where U runs through all open subsets of X) that is compatible with restriction maps in
the following sense: for any inclusion V ⊆ U between open subsets of X , the following
diagram commutes
A(U) φU−−−−→ B(U)y
y
A(V ) φV−−−−→ B(V )
where vertical maps are the restrictions induced by the inclusion V ⊆U .
It is worth noticing that (pre)sheaves of L -structures of some theory T over a topolog-
ical space — whose open sets can be viewed as a poset category that is a Heyting algebra
— define a notion of model that is complete for intuitionistic logic. An L -structure is a
set with an interpretation of the first order language L , and the morphisms between L -
structures, in particular the restrictions morphisms of the sheaf, are functions that preserves
function symbols and the truth of atomic formulae — hence they are more general than the
usual elementary morphisms of model theory which preserve the truth of all formulae.
This construction due to Joyal is related to forcing and is a particular case of Kripke mod-
els [24] and therefore is known as Kripke-Joyal forcing. [7] The proof of completeness of
(pre)sheaf models can be inferred from results in [41]; recently, Ciardelli obtained a short
and direct proof of this completeness result [11].
A sheaf of sets is a presheaf F which satisfies the following condition: for any open
subset U of X and any family (Ui) of open subsets of X such that U = ∪Ui, there is an
equaliser diagram
F (U)→∏
i
F (Ui)⇒∏
j,k
F (U j ∩Uk)
(this means that the first map is injective and its image is exactly the set where the two
other maps coincide2).
In other words, a “compatible” family of local sections of F can be glued—in a unique
way—into a global section of F i.e. a U-section of F . This is exactly what one needs in
order to perform “local to global” yoga.
By definition, a morphism of sheaves is just the same as a morphism of presheaves.
Hence the category of sheaves on X , that we denote by Sh(X), is a full subcategory of
the category of presheaves. In order to describe its properties, we introduce the notion of
cartesian closed category (CCC).
Definition 1. A category is said to be cartesian closed whenever:
(1) It has a terminal object here noted 1 (it can be noted T );
1Explicitely, a presheaf A is a family of sets A(U) (where U runs through all open subsets of X) together with
restriction maps A(U)→ A(V) for any inclusion V ⊆U between open subsets of X . Of course, these restriction
maps can be composed, that is, if W ⊆V ⊆U then the restriction map A(U)→ A(W) is equal to the composition
A(U)→ A(V )→ A(W).
2The first map is induced by inclusions Ui ⊆U , and the two other maps are respectively induced by inclusions
U j ∩Uk ⊆U j and U j ∩Uk ⊆Uk.
CATEGORY THEORY, LOGIC AND FORMAL LINGUISTICS: SOME CONNECTIONS, OLD AND NEW 5
(2) Any two objects A and B have a product written A×B;
(3) Any two objects A and B have an exponential noted BA or A → B.
In more detail, 1 a terminal object is an object 1 such that for any object A there exists
a unique arrow A → 1; 2 if A and B are two objects, the product A×B (if it exists) is an
object such that, for all Y , there is a bijection Hom(Y,A)×Hom(Y,B) ≃ Hom(Y,A×B)
which is natural in Y ; 3 if A and B are two objects, the exponential noted BA (if it exists)
is an object such that, for all Y , there is a bijection Hom(Y ×A,B) ≃ Hom(Y,BA) which
is natural in Y . Another limit is useful, equaliser: given tow morphisms f and g from A
to B, an equaliser of f and g is a morphism e from C to A such that f ◦ e = g ◦ e and for
any morphism d from D to A with f ◦ d = g ◦ d there is a unique k from D to C such that
e◦ k = d.
Let us check that Sh(X) is cartesian closed. The constant sheaf 1 defined by 1(U) = {∗}
for all U is clearly a terminal object in Sh(X). The product of two sheaves, as well as the
equaliser of sheaf morphisms with the same domain and codomain exist, hence all finite
limits exist in the category of sheaves. Finally, exponential objects exist: for any two
sheaves A and B, we let BA be the sheaf U 7→ Hom(A|U ,B|U), where F |U denotes the
restriction of F to U3.
More generally, the category Sh(X) inherits many properties from the category of sets,
which is not surprising if we consider a sheaf as being a “continuous family of sets”. This
leads us to the next topic, namely elementary toposes.
Definition 2. According to Lawvere and Tierney, an elementary topos is a category E
satisfying the following properties:
(1) E has finite limits;
(2) E has exponentials;
(3) E has a subobject classifier.
The first two conditions imply that a topos is a cartesian closed category. In fact, the
main difference between CCC and toposes is the existence of a subobject classifier.
Let us recall that Ω is a subobject classifier if, for any object A of E , there is a natural
isomorphism between subobjects of A and the set of maps A → Ω. More precisely, Ω
comes with a canonical map 1 → Ω (where 1 is the terminal object of E) which satisfies
the following universal property: for any monomorphism f : B → A there exists a unique
morphism g : A →Ω such that the square
B −−−−→ 1
f
y
y
A g−−−−→ Ω
is a fibered product or pullback (roughly speaking, B is the inverse image of 1 by g).
In the category of sets, Ω = {0,1} (Boolean truth-values).
In the category of sheaves, the subobject classifier is defined as follows: for any open
subset U of X , we let Ω(U) to be the set of all open subsets of U . Roughly speaking,
an assertion inside the topos Sh(X) may have an intermediate truth value, which from the
viewpoint of an open subset U is the open subset of U where the assertion is true.
In this issue, the paper Continuity and geometric logic by Steve Vickers emphasises
the connection with topology by exploring geometric logic, that is many sorted logic with
finite conjunctions and arbitrary disjunctions (also existential quantification). Given that
3This sheaf U 7→ Hom(A|U ,B|U ) is often called “internal hom”.
6 JEAN GILLIBERT, CHRISTIAN RETOR ´E
axiom
x:A ⊢ x:A
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp ⊢ t:B exchange
(σ :permutation)zσ(1):Zσ(1),...,zσ(p):Zσ(p) ⊢ t:B
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp,x:A,x:A ⊢ t:B
contraction
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp,x:A ⊢ t:B
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp,⊢ t:B
weakening
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp,x:A ⊢ t:B
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp,x:A ⊢ t:B
abstraction / hypothetical reasoning
Γ,x:A ⊢ (λ xA.t):A → B
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp,⊢ f :A → B y1:Y1,...,yk:Yk ⊢ u:A
application / modus ponens
z1:Z1,...,zp:Zp,y1:Y1,...,yk:Yk ⊢ f (u):B
FIGURE 1. The Curry-Howard isomorphism [22]. Upper case letters
stand for propositions. On the left handside of “⊢” one only has type
assignments for variables, like x : X . On the right hand side, before
the “:” there is a lambda term which encodes the proofs. Leaving out
terms, that are on the left hand side of “:” one get a standard natural
deduction system for proposition logic as introduced by Gentzen. [15,
16] These rules infer a sequent from one or two sequents a sequent being
a sequence of hypotheses and a formula on the right hand side, Z1, ..,Zp ⊢
C meaning: (Z1& · · ·Zp)→C.
classical models of a geometric theory T are not complete, one has to look models of T
inside a topos, and there exists a classifying topos whose category of T models is universal.
This is a point-free manifestation of the “space of models of T ”.
4. INTUITIONISTIC PROOFS, TYPED LAMBDA CALCULUS AND CARTESIAN CLOSED
CATEGORIES
A second link between intutionistic logic and category theory is the following. Proofs in
(propositional) intuitionistic logic can be viewed as typed lambda terms, that are functional
programs. The main idea is that a proof of A → B maps proofs of A to proofs of B, hence
it is rather natural to interpret a formula (with ∧,→) by the sets of its proofs. Functions
can be applied to arguments of the right type, and composed. To compute such a term,
one substitutes the occurrences of the bound variable used to define the function with the
argument of the function:
(λ xA. tB)(uA) β t[xA: = uA]
Values are normal terms i.e. terms that cannot be reduced any further.
In figure 4 we give the proof rules and the corresponding proof terms, that are simply
typed lambda terms, a good reference being [20] and [25] on the categorical aspects.
Functions in this setting are algorithms (that always converge) that represent total recur-
sive functions, the ones whose totality can be proved within the underlying logical system.
They are defined intentionally, how could one view them as usual functions? Functions
can be viewed as morphisms in a cartesian closed category, cf. definition 1 above — in this
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logical setting, BA is rather written A→ B. Observe that the logical rules match categorical
isomorphisms, for instance,
A → (B →C)∼= (A×B)→C
Closed terms (i.e. terms without free variables) of type U also can be viewed as maps from
the terminal object 1 to U — this view is supported by the fact, that 1= {∗} in the category
of set.
A function in the model interprets a function as a static notion (a “set” of pairs 〈x, f (x)〉)
and not as a (functional) algorithm: indeed whenever a term/proof t reduces to t◦ its inter-
pretation as a morphism in the category is the same.
Given that functions from A to B are definable by terms/proofs, the set Hom(A,B)
should be countable. Therefore, “elements” in BA, that are arrows from in 1, should be
countable as well, and this imposes a drastic restriction on the morphisms we consider in
the category. The study of such models of intuitionistic proofs lead to linear logic as we
shall see in section 6.
A result by Joyal (unpublished see e.g. [25, 18]) shows that all proofs of a given formula
are equivalent in classical logic. Although there also exists a logical, syntactical analogous
result by Girard and Lafont (see figure 2), Joyal proved a category theoretical formulation
of this statement:
Proposition 1. In a cartesian closed category interpreting classical logic between any
two objects (formulae) A and B there is at most one morphism from A to B (at most one
interpretation of proofs of A ⊢ B).
Proof. The interpretation of classical logic needs an initial object 0 (false) and a negation
¬A = (A → 0) which is involutive i.e. A ∼= ((A → 0)→ 0). To see that in such a situation
there exists at most one arrow between any two objects, let us first see that in a CCC with
an initial object 0 when there is a map from Z some object to 0, then Z is initial as well:
(1) If 0 is initial, then is 0×Z is initial as well. Indeed, in a CCC , maps from 0×Z
to any object U are in bijection with maps from 0 to UZ = [Z →U ].
(2) If there exists an arrow f from Z to 0 then Z is isomorphic to 0×Z and therefore Z
is initial. Indeed, pi2◦〈 f , IdZ〉= IdZ (by definition of pi2) and 〈 f , IdZ〉◦pi2 = Id0×Z
because it goes from 0×Z to itself, which is initial because of 1 above.
Maps from A to B correspond to maps from A to ¬¬B ∼= (B → 0)→ 0 and thus to maps
from A× (B→ 0) to 0. But from 2 it follows that such a map is an isomorphism and there
is precisely one such isomorphism since 0 is initial. 
This result, simple enough to be presented in this introduction, clearly shows that intu-
itionistic logic is the natural logic of the CCC interpretation of proofs — in the previous
section we already saw that intuitionistic also is the logic of toposes which generalise set
theory.
5. MARTIN-LO¨F TYPE THEORY AND IDENTITY TYPES
One may further refine the operations (exponential, product) on the simple types of
Church [10] of the previous section 4 as linear logic defined in next section 6 does, or
consider a wider set of types as Martin-Lo¨f type theory does.
Actually, the most prominent feature of Martin-Lo¨f type theory is that there are types
which depend on terms as e.g. Vect(n) for n : N, the type of vectors of length n. Proposi-
tions are considered as types and, accordingly, predicates may be considered as dependent
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δ1
·
·
·
⊢ F
weakening
⊢ F,K
δ2
·
·
·
⊢ F
weakening
⊢ F,¬K
cut
⊢ F,F
contr.
⊢ F
FIGURE 2. This proof defined from δ1 and δ2— that are any two proofs
of the same formula F —- reduces to δ1 or to δ2 followed by the exactly
the same rules. Hence any two proofs of the same formula are equivalent
in classical logic.
types. The most important example of dependent types will be identity types as discussed
subsequently.
Martin-Lo¨f type theory provides the necessary technology to deal with the standard
mathematical concept of a family of sets. Moreover a dependent type can be considered
as as predicate; for example if we are given a dependent type B(x) with x : A (a family of
types indexed by the type A), we can think of A as a set and B(x) as a family of sets, but
in addition, if we consider B(x) as a predicate, given a hypothetical element a of A and a
hypothetical b in A(a) we can think of b as a proof witness that shows the truth of B(a).
Type theory as formalized by Martin-Lo¨f gives us access to the construction of
• the type (Πx : A)B(x) whose intuitive elements should be seen as functions f that
map a term a : A to a term f (a) : B(a). In case B does not depend on x, the type
(Πx : A)B(x) corresponds to the type A → B of simply typed lambda calculus.
When we see dependent types as predicates, we now have access to the universal
quantifier.
• the type (Σx : A)B(x) whose elements should be seen are pairs (a,b) with a : A and
b : B(a). If B(x) does not depend on x, the type (Σx : A)B corresponds to the type
A×B of simply types lambda calculus, and we also have access to the existential
quantifier when we think of a type as a predicate.
The presence of dependent types forces us to consider the following judgements
Γ ⊢Valid The context Γ is valid
Γ ⊢ A in the context Γ, A is a type.
Γ ⊢ A = B the types A and B are equal
Γ ⊢ t : A in the context Γ, t is of type A
Γ ⊢ t = u : A t and u are equal terms of type A.
This notion of equality is called judgemental and can be decided by normalisation. But
it cannot be combined into propositions for which reason one introduces the notion of
propositional equality. If t,s : A one may form the types IdA(t,s) whose elements will
be proofs that t and s are equal. Reflexivity is given by the constructor rA(t) : IdA(t, t)
for t : A. As usual in type theory a constructor is accompanied by an eliminator which
in case of identity types happens to be called J and can be described as follows. Given
a family of types x,y : A,z : IdA(x,y) ⊢ C and a term x,y : A,z : IdA(x,y) ⊢ d : C(x,y,z)
one may consider the term x,y : A,z : IdA(x,y) ⊢ J((x)d,z) : C(x,y,z) whose meaning is
provided by the reduction rule J((x)d,rA(t)) = d[t/x]. This is in accordance with functional
programming where functions are defined by pattern matching aka structural recursion.
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This is how equality is represented in intensional type theory of [31]. In [32] judgemen-
tal and propositional equality get identified via a so-called equality reflection rule allowing
one to conclude t = s : A from p : IdA(t,s). This, however, renders type checking undecid-
able and, therefore, has been abandoned. Current proof checkers as e.g. the widely used
system Coq [6] are based on intensional type theory. This is sometimes inconvenient but
allows one to avoid the manipulation and storing of derivation trees for typing judgements
as in the much older NuPrL system.
As said above in section 3, toposes admit an internal logic in form of intuitionistic higher
order arithmetic. In this logic propositions are not represented as types but as subobjects
of the terminal object 1. Accordingly, predicates on a type A are represented as monomor-
phisms into A. On the other hand, a good interpretation of Martin-Lo¨f type theory needs a
predicate on a type A to be represented by a morphism B → A which is more general than
just a monomorphism, since we want the ability to distinguish between proof witnesses.
Thus we need a a distinguished class of morphisms (often called display maps), which are
subject to a few simple conditions, the most important of which being that the pullback of
a display map with codomain A by any morphism with same codomain is again a display
map. This corresponds to being able to substitute a term for a variable in a predicate. It
is then possible to interpret the Π-types when a right adjoint always exists to that pullback
functor. When this happens we have a display category with (dependent) products, and
when all maps of the category can be used as display maps, we have a locally cartesian
closed categories. There are many display categories with dependent products, but it turned
out to be harder to find examples that have a good, nontrivial (i.e., non collapsed) versions
of the intensional identity type. For example locally cartesian closed categories are guar-
anteed to give trivial identity types. The first good example was given by M. Hofmann and
Th. Streicher in [21], where types were interpreted as groupoids, display maps as fibra-
tions of groupoids (very easy to define), and IdA(x,y) as the set of morphisms (necessarily
isomorphisms) from x to y. This model was only nontrivial in dimension one, in the sense
that iterating the identy type would land us on the old, trivial, nonintensional interpretation
where identity is just the diagonal.
It was realized that if a model of dependent types has an intensional identity type, then
we are very close to being able to do topology (especially, homotopy theory) in it. This is
because in such an identity type, we can view an intuitive element of IDA(x,y) (a proof that
x is equal to y) as a path from x to y, and we are able to do many constructions of homotopy
theory, with the additional bonus of dependent products.
Thus inspirations for good models of identity types were bound to come from algebraic
topology, and this is the case for the first completely non-degenerate model, where paths
in higher dimensions (higher homotopies) do not collapse, and which was found indepen-
dently by Streicher and Voevodsky around 2006 (see e.g. [44, 40]. The base category
is the presheaf topos of simplicial sets, the most studied of all models in combinatorial
topology, and families of types (i.e., display maps) are interpreted as Kan fibrations, which
forces ordinary, non-dependent types to be Kan complexes. As expected, the identity type
IdA(x,y) is the standard construction for the path object in the sense of the usual Quillen
model structure on simplicial sets.[39]
Another inspiration from topology, namely in the theory of fiber bundles, has led V. Vo-
evodsky [4] to propose the Univalence Axiom in what is now called Homotopy Type Theory
(HoTT), which applies to universes, like those found in Coq and those defined by Martin-
Lo¨f, and can be viewed as the statement that in a “good” universe isomorphic types are
equal.
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The present issue contains two papers about categorical models of identity types, both
having links to homotopy type theory:
• Franc¸ois Lamarche in his paper Modelling Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory in Categories
proposes a simple model of Martin-Lo¨f type theory that includes both dependent
products and the identity types.
• Thomas Streicher in the next paper describes A Model of Type Theory in Simpli-
cial Sets in which the Voevodsky Univalence axiom holds.
Although little work has been done in this direction, categorical models of type theory
should be very appealing from the viewpoint of natural language semantics, to be evoked
in section 7.
Indeed, natural language semantics, philosophy of language, analytic philosophy has al-
ways been interested in models (classical models, possibles worlds, situations) and nowa-
days, natural language semantics is often formalised and computed within type theory —
as exemplified in the present issue, see section 7.
6. FROM A PARTICULAR CATEGORICAL INTERPRETATION TO LINEAR LOGIC
While Martin-Lo¨f type theory discussed in previous section 5 extends the expressive
power of simply typed theory with dependent types, one can also have a closer look at
the intuitionistic logical connectives & and → from a computational perspective bearing
in mind that an involutive negation like the one of classical logic brings many convenient
and elegant properties. One thus discompose the connective of intuitonistic logic and finds
a classical but constructive logic called linear logic.[17, 18].
Linear logic, present in two papers of the present issue, arose from the study of a particu-
lar cartesian closed category that interprets proofs of intuitionistic logic, namely coherence
spaces and deserve some extra information: coherence spaces, which are discussed in the
present issue regarding their relation to formal ontologies, see section 7.
A coherence space is basically a simple graph (possibly infinite, but without loops nor
multiple edges) but entities that interpret terms or proofs in a coherence space are not its
vertices but the cliques of this graph, i.e. its complete subgraphs. A stable map from A to
B maps cliques of A to cliques of B, and it enjoys certain properties: monotony (a ⊂ b ⇒
F(a) ⊂ F(b)), preservation of directed unions (F(∪ ↑ ai) = ∪F(ai)) and of intersections
inside a clique (when a∪a′ is a clique of A one has F(a∩b) = F(a)∩F(b)) The important
point is that a stable function from a coherence space A to another one B can be viewed as
a clique of a larger coherence space A → B, whose vertices are (a,β ) where β is a vertex
of B and a a finite clique of A, such that β ∈ F(a) and a is minimal for this property — F
being stable there always exists such a finite a, and one of them a is minimal and in fact
the minimum. Two vertices (a,β ) and (a′,β ′) of A → B are said to be coherent whenever
a∪a′ is a clique of A implies that β and β ′ are coherent in B and when furthermore a and
a′ are distinct so are β and β ′.
One then has a bijection between stable functions from A to B and the cliques of the
coherence space A → B. There is also a product of coherence spaces, which is the disjoint
union of the two graphs, plus edges between any vertex of A and any vertex of B.
The categorical product corresponds to the rule from Γ ⊢ A and Γ ⊢ B infer Γ ⊢ A&B,
while the other product ⊗ corresponds to the rule from Γ ⊢ A and ∆ ⊢ B infer Γ,∆ ⊢
A⊗ B. These two conjunctions of linear logic cannot be distinguished in intuitionistic
logic, because of the weakening and contraction rules given in figure 4.
Interpreting proofs in coherence spaces, where operation on coherence spaces corre-
spond to logical connectives lead to linear logic. Indeed, besides the product described
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above there is another “product”, which is not a categorical product, whose vertices are
pairs of vertices, with an edge between (a,b) and (a′,b′) whenever there is an edge {a,a′}
and an edge {b,b′} in B — a = a′ or b = b′ is allowed as well, but not both since there are
no loops in simple graphs.
Besides these pairs of conjunction, one discovers an involutive negation A⊥ whose sim-
ple graph is the complement of the simple graph (simple graphs contain no loop). Using De
Morgan laws it maps the two aforementioned conjunctions to two disjunctions respectively
written ⊕ (additive disjunction) and ℘ (multiplicative disjunction).
There also exists a unary operator ! which relates linear logic (resource sensitive) to
intuitionistic logic. The coherence space !A is defined as follows: its vertices are the finite
cliques of A, and two vertices a and a′ of !A, that is to say two finite cliques of A, are
coherent in !A whenever the union a∪a′ is a clique of A. This operator turns the additive
conjunction & into the multiplicative conjunction⊗: !(A&B)≡!A⊗!B.
A kind of classical implication can be defined from the ℘ disjunction: A⊥℘B, it is
written as A⊸ B, and the intuitionistic implication can be defined as:
A → B =!A⊸ B
Linear logic was provided with a syntax, both with sequent calculus and with proofnets
that identify proofs up to rule permutations. Propositional linear logic is also endowed
with a truth value semantics phase semantics.
In this issue, the paper entitled Relational semantics for full linear logic by Dion Coumans,
Mai Gehrke, Lorijn van Rooijen proposes a Kripke style semantics for full propositional
linear logic, i.e. with, additives, multiplicatives and exponentials that allow the addition
of proper axioms.
7. LINGUISTIC APPLICATIONS: COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS,
AND KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
Natural language semantics is usually expressed by first order (some times higher order)
logic or predicate calculus, single sorted as Frege wished to, and computed according
to Frege’s compositionally principle: the meaning of the compound is a function of the
meaning of its parts. [42, 38, 14].
This is easily implemented in lambda calculus where anything is a function, as noticed
by Montague in 1970 [34]. Typed λ -terms for representing logical formulae are usually
defined out of two base types, e for individuals (also known as entities) and t for proposi-
tions (which have a truth value). Logical formulae can be defined in this typed λ -calculus
as first observed by Church in 1940 [10], but the combination of word meaning (partial
formulae) according to the syntactic structure of the sentence is due to Montague.
This early use of lambda calculus, where formulae are viewed as typed lambda terms,
can not be merged with the more familiar view of typed lambda terms as proofs evoked
in the section 4. The proof which such a typed lambda term corresponds to is simply the
proof that the formula is well formed, e.g. that a two-place predicate is properly applied
to two individual terms of type e and not to more or less arguements, nor to arguments
of a different type etc. This initial vision of lambda calculus was designed for a proper
handling of substitution in deductive systems a` la Hilbert. One needs constants for the
logical quantifiers and connectives:
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word semantic type u∗
semantics : λ -term of type u∗
xv the variable or constant x is of type v
some (e → t)→ ((e → t)→ t)
λ Pe→t λ Qe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λ xe(&t→(t→t)(P x)(Q x))))
club e → t
λ xe(clube→t x)
defeated e → (e → t)
λ ye λ xe ((defeatede→(e→t) x)y)
Leeds e
Leeds
FIGURE 3. A simple semantic lexicon
Logical connectives and quantifiers
Constant Type
&, and t → (t → t)
∨, or t → (t → t)
⇒, implies t → (t → t)
∃ (e→ t)→ t
∀ (e→ t)→ t
Predicates and constants
Constant Type
defeated, . . . e→ (e→ t)
won,voted, . . . (e→ t)
Liverpool,Leeds, . . . e
. . . . . .
as well as predicates for the precise language to be described — a binary predicate like
won has the type e→ e→ t.
A small example goes as follows. Assume that the syntactical analysis of the sentence
“Some club defeated Leeds.” is
(some (club)) (defeated Leeds)
where the function is always the term on the left. If the semantic terms are as in the lexicon
in figure 3, placing the semantical terms in place of the words yields a large λ -term that
can be reduced:
((
λ Pe→t λ Qe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λ xe(&(P x)(Q x))))
)(
λ xe(clube→t x)
))
((
λ ye λ xe ((defeatede→(e→t) x)y)
)
Leedse
)
↓ β(
λ Qe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λ xe(&t→(t→t)(clube→t x)(Q x))))
)
(
λ xe ((defeatede→(e→t) x)Leedse)
)
↓ β(
∃(e→t)→t (λ xe(&(clube→t x)((defeatede→(e→t) x)Leedse)))
)
This λ -term of type t that can be called the logical form of the sentence, represents the
following formula of predicate calculus (admittedly more pleasant to read):
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∃x : e (club(x) & defeated(x,Leeds))
Thus defined, computational semantics looks a miracle. But this miracle does not ac-
count for selectional restriction (a “book” cannot “bark”), does not tell anything of the
relations between predicates (a “book” can be “read”), nor of the correspondence of pred-
icates with concepts (a book is both an informational and a physical entity), nor of the
relation between the logical language for semantics and world knowledge and ontologies.
Issues such as selectional restriction have been much discussed in type theoretical frame-
work e.g. in [13, 3, 5, 2, 28].
In his paper Selectional Restrictions, Types and Categories, Nicholas Asher discusses
the introduction of types as objects of a category (instead of a single e) endowed with
categorical operations that go beyond the logical ones: he is thus able to correctly account
for selectional restriction, felicitous and infelicitous copredications.
This framework in which one composes functions to compute meanings and ultimately
the truth values in a given model is given a categorical formalisation by Anne Preller in
her paper Natural Language Semantics in Biproduct Dagger Categories. Starting with pre-
group grammars defined in an algebraic structure that can be viewed as non commutative
linear logic in which ℘= ⊗, she computes the meaning categories with extra operations,
as finite dimensional vector spaces or two sorted functions over finite sets. She can then ac-
count of meaning with the usual set theoretic interpretations or with bags of words vectors
used for text classification.
An underlying question, in relation to the interpretation of common nouns and to the
bags of words approach is what a concept or a base type is, and the interrelations between
base types. For instance one can say “a cat sleeps”, because “animals” can “sleep” and
“cats” are “animals”. In the kind of model used in semantics ontological relations are quite
common, but here is no specific structure to represent these ontological relations.
The paper entitled Formal ontologies and coherent spaces by Michel Abrusci, Christophe
Fouquere´ and Marco Romano exploits the structure of coherent spaces that we discussed in
section 6 to give a formal account of the relation between entities and concepts, encoding
properties of formal ontologies.
Thanks: We are indebted to Mai Gehrke, Alain Lecomte, Anne Preller, Steve Vickers,
Gilles Ze´mor, and especially to Franc¸ois Lamarche and Thomas Streicher for a quick but
efficient rereading of this introduction, which they all contributed to improve. Remaining
errors and confusions are ours.
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